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NOTES AND COMMENTS
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(a)
AND THE SCOPE OF APPELLATE FACT
REVIEW: HAS APPLICATION OF THE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS RULE BEEN
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS?
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that,
in the absence of a jury, or in those instances where an advisory jury
is utilized, a trial court specifically state the findings of fact and
conclusions of law upon which its decision rests.' Appellate review
of the lower court's findings of fact is contemplated by the rule, but
the findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
of the credibility of the witnesses."' 2 This "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard has been the subject of heated controversy,3 not because of
difficulty in determining whether lower court findings are clearly
erroneous,4 but because of the language in the rule referring to the
trial court's opportunity to judge witness demeanor.' That language
has been invoked in justification of widely divergent appellate deci-
sions, ranging from complete adherence to the trial court's findings
of fact to complete disregard of those findings, depending upon the
Rule 52(a) provides in part:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58; and in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of
fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master,
to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the
court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
2Id.
See, e.g., Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Jury Cases, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 68 (1936)
[hereinafter cited as Blume]; Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 533, 540-44, 572 (1936); Clark, Review of Facts Under Proposed
Federal Rules, 20 J. AM. Ju9. Soc'y 129 (1936); Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and
Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 493, 505-06 (1950); Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1957).
See notes 43-44 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 30-55 and accompanying text infra.
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qualitative difference between witness testimony and documentary
evidence. This Note will examine the controversy surrounding the
proper application of rule 52(a). As an aid to understanding its
current interpretation by the various circuit courts of appeals, the
rule's historical background will be traced. This Note will then at-
tempt to delineate the numerous factors to be considered in apply-
ing the rule equitably, placing particular emphasis upon the distinc-
tion which has developed with respect to the nature of the evidence
presented to the trial court.
SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT PRIOR TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 'PROCEDURE
Federal appellate courts historically have possessed the power
to review factual determinations made by juries in legal actions and
by judges in equity suits.' Fear that jury verdicts would be rendered
freely reviewable, and hence meaningless, 7 was dispelled by the in-
clusion in the Constitution of the seventh amendment, which states
that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common
law.' 8 While jury verdicts thus traditionally have been held to be
inviolate rn the presence of sufficient supporting evidence,9 no such
' U.S. CONsT. art. El, § 2 provides: "The judicial Power [vested in the Supreme Court]
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made . .." Article ImI further provides: "[Tihe Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. Pursuant to
the power given Congress to create inferior federal courts, id. art. I, § 8, federal appellate
courts were given powers of review similar to those of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1292 (1970).
The constitutional provision permitting review of factual questions "was construed as
[taking] away from the citizen his right to a jury trial, and [setting] the verdict of the
jury at naught in the hands of an unfriendly and as yet unconstituted federal court." Clark
& Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 192 (1937) [hereinafter cited as
Clark & Stone] (citing SECRET PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 80-81
(1787); J. Dickinson, Letter of Fabius on the Federal Constitution (1788); Pamphlet of El-
bridge Gerry (Boston 1788); R.H. Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer to a Republican (New
York, October 12, 1787); G. Mason, Objections Addressed to the Citizens of Virginia; Winth-
rop, Essays of Agrippa, Massachusetts Gazette, December 11, 1787). There existed at the
time a deep seated prejudice in America against the courts of chancery, which were perceived
as symbols of autocratic power and overly strong central government. It was felt that the
citizen could be protected from these tribunals only by the presence of a jury. SECRET PRO-
CEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 79 (1787), cited in Clark & Stone, supra,
at 192; Blume, supra note 3, at 69 (citing JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 107-09 (E. Maclay ed.
1890)); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L.
REv. 49, 102 (1923).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 91 (1891); 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
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definitive rule existed regarding the bounds of appellate review of
factual findings made by a judge in an equitable action. 0 As a
consequence of this lack of guidance, appellate courts developed a
self-imposed body of principles establishing limited review" of lower
52.02, at 2611 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]. Questions of law were and are
freely reviewable. Id. 1 52.03121, at 2662.
11 In an early attempt to establish a concrete standard of factual review in equity actions,
Congress enacted section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. The statute
subjected equity appeals to the writ of error procedure, id., and thereby precluded review of
a trial judge's findings of fact in those actions. See Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321,
327 (1796). The Judiciary Act abolished another equitable practice, the taking of evidence
by deposition, and substituted the common law devices of oral testimony and examination
of witnesses. Ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 88 (1789). This latter provision, thought to be a "great
triumph for the anti-chancery party," Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 100 (1923), coupled with the writ of error proce-
dure, significantly increased the importance of the lower court's role in determining the
credibility of witnesses.
In 1802, depositions were again permitted in equity suits at the request of either party,
Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 25, 2 Stat. 166, and in 1803, the use of the writ of error in
those actions was abolished. The Act of March 3, 1803 provided that appeals would be allowed
in equity, and added a requirement that a transcript of the lower court preceeding be trans-
mitted to the appellate court. Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 244. The statute was
construed as abolishing the writ of error in equity cases. The San Pedro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.)
132 (1817). One commentator found three reasons for the abandonment of the writ of error
procedure: the writ of error requirement that questions of fact be separated from questions
of law was nearly impossible to fulfill since the two are so intermingled in equity cases; there
was a large percentage of cases in which the only important questions were those of fact, and
which therefore were completely unreviewable; and the Judiciary Act had required the lower
courts to send a statement of facts to the appellate court rather than the evidence itself, and
therefore encouraged the trial court to first reach a result and then draw up a statement of
facts supporting that result. Blume, supra note 3, at 69-70.
With the adoption in 1912 of Equity Rule 46, EQUITY R. 46, 226 U.S. 661 (1912), which
reinstated the requirement that the testimony of witnesses in equity trials be taken in court
rather than by deposition, lower courts' findings of fact became significantly more persuasive
to the appellate courts in those cases in which elements of credibility of witnesses were
determinative. See Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Docu-
mentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REv. 506, 510-11 (1963).
1 Appellate self-discipline has been said to have resulted in a level of review approaching
the standard employed in actions at law. Clark & Stone, supra note 7, at 207. Since there
was no constitutional prohibition against review of findings of fact in equity actions, however,
the self-control exercised by an appellate court was discretionary in nature, and exceptions
were readily made where justice so required. It has been noted that "[eiquity review, as
defined in the federal precedents, tended to follow a middle course, broader than that in legal
actions where reversal was only for errors of law, but more restrictive than that in admiralty
.... " ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE OF 1955 TO PROPOSED (BUT UNADOPTED) AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, reprinted in MOORE, supra note 9, 52.01171 at 2608.
See notes 12-15 and accompanying text infra. Admiralty cases were traditionally subject to
de novo review as to both fact and law, Wright, Amendments to the Federal Rules: The
Function of a Continuing Rules Committee, 7 VAND. L. REv. 521, 533 (1954), but in 1954 the
Supreme Court confirmed a trend in favor of extending application of the clearly erroneous
standard, applying it in admiralty cases. McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19 (1954). In
1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were expressly made applicable to all admiralty
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court findings of fact in equity cases. The degree of latitude permit-
ted in evaluating such findings was governed by the nature of the
evidence which formed the basis of the lower court determination.
The character of evidence fell into three categories. Conclusions
dependent upon oral testimony were often treated as presumptively
correct,12 as the trial judge was in the best position to determine
demeanor and credibility."3 Findings based purely on documentary
or undisputed evidence were never deemed conclusive, and were
subject to more extensive review, 4 since the evidence was as easily
interpreted at the appellate level as at the actual trial. When the
evidence, though documentary, was conflicting, a third standard of
review was employed: the lower court's findings were presumed cor-
rect unless obvious error was found to have been made in consider-
ing the evidence. 5 Thus, factual conclusions reached by a jury in a
legal action were subject to one standard of review, while those of
cases. FED. R. Cir. P. 1.
The restricted nature of appellate review of facts in equity suits is suggested by a random
survey of 55 equity cases decided between 1900 and 1934. Conducted by Professors Clark and
Stone, the survey found only four reversals based upon a review of the facts. Clark & Stone,
supra note 7, at 208-09 & n.85.
12 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). See Clark &
Stone, supra note 7, at 207-09. Reversal of lower court findings of fact under such circumstan-
ces were predicated on their being "clearly erroneous," which was ultimately defined by the
Supreme Court: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948).
," Professor Blume stood alone in expressing doubt concerning the validity of the notion
that a trial judge who hears testimony first hand is in a better position to judge credibility
than an appellate judge who depends on a printed record:
This supposed truth became accepted before the days of court stenographers and
has persisted in spite of the fact that it is now possible to reproduce for the appellate
court the exact words of the questions propounded, and the answers given, in the
court below ....
.. . It may be that in the course of time scientific discovery will make it possible
to read a man's mind by looking at his face and hands, but until that time comes
very little weight can be given safely to demeanor evidence.
Blume, supra note 3, at 71-72.
" Slight weight was given to lower court findings where the evidence was in the form of
deposition or uncontradicted testimony. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States v.
Irelan, 123 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1941); see Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchants' Ass'n, 64 F.2d
575 (6th Cir. 1933). But see Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN.
L. Rav. 751, 768 (1957), wherein it is stated that "there was no generally accepted doctrine
as to the scope of review of findings of fact where the testimony was not oral."
11 See, e.g., Fienup v. Kleinman, 5 F.2d 137, 141 (8th Cir. 1925); Butte & Superior Copper
Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty Co., 248 F. 609, 616 (9th Cir. 1918), aff'd, 249 U.S. 12 (1919);
Lilienthal v. McCormick, 117 F. 89, 97 (9th Cir. 1902).
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judges in equitable actions were evaluated under one of three sepa-
rate and distinct principles.
This area of the law was further complicated by the enactment
of the Act of March 3, 1865,16 which allowed the waiver of jury trial
in legal actions. The result of the legislation was an action which
closely resembled a suit in equity, due to the absence of a jury, but
which was in reality an action at law, and treated as such by appel-
late courts; the trial judge's findings of fact, whether special or
general, were given the same effect as the verdict of a jury. 7 Follow-
ing the merger of law and equity mandated by Congresg in 1934,11
the multiple standards of factual review presented a serious prob-
lem to the drafters of the proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
DRAFTING AND ADOPTING RULE 52(a)
Early debate concerned the proper scope of appellate review of
nonjury findings of fact in a unified system, and centered upon a
choice among three alternatives as the principle to adopt: maintain-
ing the existing system of review under which the findings of fact
made by a court were reviewable as to both weight and sufficiency
of evidence in suits at equity, while according findings of fact in
legal actions the same effect as a jury verdict; affording all findings
of fact, in law or equity, the effect of a jury verdict; adopting the
equity standard of review in all cases, thereby rendering all trial-
judge findings completely reviewable.11 The Advisory Committee on
Rules for Civil Procedure chose to apply the broader standard of
equity review.2" Thus, the 1936 Preliminary Draft of the Federal
Rules provided that: "The findings of the court in such cases shall
16 Ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 501 (1865).
'T Id. The enactment of the jury waiver provision was perceived as "a victory of the
common law over its rivals and an extension of its jurisdiction and procedural review even
over those cases where the jury was not present." Clark & Stone, supra note 7, at 199 (footnote
omitted). Professor Blume, however, characterized the statute as a "legislative error" which
accorded the findings of a trial judge greater weight than the verdict of a jury, since the trial
judge's findings are reviewed by an appellate court whereas a jury verdict is reviewed by the
trial judge on motion for a new trial. Blume, supra note 3, at 71.
IS Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970)).
'g ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, NOTE TO THE SUPREME COURT, PRELIMI-
NARY DRAFT, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 120-21 (1936).
20 Id. at 120. The Committee rejected a dual standard based upon law and equity as
"[perpetuating] the very procedural distinctions which [the Committee was] attempting
to abolish," id., but gave no particular reason for rejecting the law standard: "Such treat-
ment, though providing for a uniform and simple method of review and fulfilling the mandate
of our enabling statute has not met with approval by a majority of the Committee." Id. at
120-21.
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have the same effect as that heretofore given to findings in suits in
equity."" In adopting the form of the rule as it reads today, the
Committee, apparently intending to deemphasize the distinction
among various types of evidence recognized under the equity stan-
dard, clarified its formulation by articulating the clearly erroneous
test,2 and mandating that "due regard. . be given to the oppor-
tunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."2
The adoption of what was in essence the equity standard sparked
lively debate, in which the Reporter for the Committee, Judge
22 Id. at 118.
12 See note 33 infra. The change in language may hAve been prompted by the debate over
the standard to be used-legal or equitable-waged by Judge Clark and Professor Blume. See
note 24 infra. The original language, a full and simple adoption of equity practice, seems to
have been toned down by the imposition of a definite test, which restricts the discretionary
power of the appellate court. Compare ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, NOTE
TO THE SUPREME COURT, PRELIMINARY DRAFr, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 118 with FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(a).
The change in language also was thought to simplify and standardize application of the
rule by providing a concrete test. Although the general principles of equity review seem to
have been clear, see notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra, there was sufficient doubt as
to the uniformity of their application, especially where documentary or undisputed evidence
was involved, to justify clarification. See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 765-69 (1957): "[Wlhile isolated cases can be found prior to
1937 in which it was said that the old de novo review continued to apply where the evidence
was not oral, it is far from clear that these represented any considered or consistent view."
Id. at 766.
It should be noted that the Advisory Committee cited two cases in its Note on Rule 52
which hold that the appellate court need not accord weight to the lower court findings of fact
when based upon documentary evidence or admitted facts. NOTES OF ADVISORY CoMITrE
ON RULES, FED. R. Civ. P. 52, 28 U.S.C. app. R. 52, at 7815 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
ORIGINAL COMMITEE NOTE] (citing Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchants' Ass'n, 64 F.2d 575,
576 (6th Cir. 1933); Dunn v. Trefry, 260 F. 147, 148 (1st Cir. 1919)). The reference to these
two cases, however, is preceded by a compare signal in the Original Committee Note, which
tends to indicate that it is doubtful that the Committee intended to utilize these cases as
examples, regardless of whether they represented a trend in the decisions. See also Clark &
Stone, supra note 7, at 208; Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on
Documentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506, 515 n.51 (1963).
FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a).
2, Public debate began with the publication of an article written by District Judge Ches-
nut attacking the proposed rule's adoption of the equitable standard of review. Chesnut,
Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, 22 A.B.A.J. 533 (1936). Solicit-
ous of the sensibilities of district courts, Judge Chesnut feared that the application of equita-
ble review would "derogate from the importance of [the trial judge's] judicial function." Id.
at 540. More specific objections included the possibilities of greater numbers of appeals, fewer
non-jury trials, and longer records on appeal, as well as the observations that the trial judge
is fully as competent as a jury to find the facts, and is better able to judge witness credibility
and determine factual issues than an appellate court which can only examine a "cold printed
record." Id. at 540-41.
Judge Chesnut was soon answered by Professor Blume, who supported the extension of
equitable review to non-jury cases in the name of necessary reviewability:
19771
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Clark, publicly disagreed with the majority by advocating adoption
of the scope of review applicable to legal actions tried by juries. 5
Nonetheless, the 1937 Committee Note to the Rules stated that the
rule in its final form "accords with the decisions on the scope of the
review in modern federal equity practice" 26 The task confronting
the judiciary then became one of interpreting the rule in light of the
multiple standards previously applied by appellate courts.27 Would
the nature of the evidence taken by a trial court, be it oral, docu-
A sure way to arouse distrust and suspicion in the public mind is to give the district
judge final power over life, liberty or property. Most law actions are decided on
issues of fact and when a jury is waived under the act of 1865 the trial judge has
the last word on the controlling issues. The reason that this has been tolerated as
long as it has been is the fact that there has always been an avenue of escape by
choosing not to waive a jury. If the act of 1865 should be made applicable to equity
cases, as proposed by Judge Chesnut, there would be no avenue of escape and the
power of the trial judge would soon become odious and the object of attack.
Blume, supra note 3, at 71. Professor Blume expressed doubt as to the value of the trial
judge's presence in determining witness credibility by observing demeanor, and emphasized
instead the value of the greater opportunity afforded a trial court to examine evidence in a
written record. Id. at 71-72. See note 13 supra. He pointed out that appellate courts probably
would not depart from their traditional discretionary refusal to reverse in the absence of
palpable error. Blume, supra note 3, at 72. Finally, he treated the question of waiver: "Under
proposed Rule 68 it is likely that the doubtful litigant will resolve his doubts in favor of waiver
knowing that an avenue of escape from an unjust decision will be open to him." Id.
Professor Blume, however, did not respond to Judge Chesnut's fear that the calendars
of appellate courts would be overloaded Nyith adequately tried cases, should the equity stan-
dard be adopted. This problem was emphasized by Judge Clark in a letter to the Editor of
the Journal of the American Judicature Society which criticized the article by Professor
Blume. Judge Clark wrote: "[Tihe equity review not only invites reversals in cases fully and
adequately tried and decided by the trial court, but it has the special disadvantage that it
retains a divided procedure which it is the chief purpose of the proposed reform to abolish in
the federal courts." Clark, Review of Facts Under Proposed Federal Rules, 20 J. AM. JUD.
Soc'Y 129, 129 (1936). Judge Clark perceived the equity rule as supplanting an old line of
demarcation, law and equity, with a distinction based upon presence or absence of a jury.
Id. at 130. He feared that "[carried to its logical conclusion, the full review would make of
the judge only a notary to supervise the transcribing of evidence." Id. Professor Blume, in
reply to the letter, reiterated the importance of reviewability: "The court should be able to
look at the result in the light of the evidence to see if justice has been done. To do this the
reviewing court must have power to review the facts as well as the law." Blume, Review of
Facts in Jury Cases-The Seventh Amendment, 20 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 130, 132 (1936).
5 See Clark, Review of Facts Under Proposed Federal Rules, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 129
(1936); Clark & Stone, supra note 7, at 217; note 24 supra.
2" ORIGINAL COMMITrEE NOTE, supra note 22, at 7815. The language of the rule itself is
derived in part from Equity Rule 701/2 as amended in 1935, which provided, in part:
In deciding suits in equity, including those required to be heard before three
judges, the court of first instance shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon; and, in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions,
the court of first instance shall similarly set forth its findings of fact and conclusions
of law which constitute the grounds of its action.
EQuITY R. 701/2, 296 U.S. 671 (1935).
27 See notes 10-15 supra.
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mentary, disputed, or undisputed, still control the latitude of review
now that a single standard had been articulated?28
EARLY INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE
The rules were not long in force before a number of courts began
to interpret rule 52(a) as placing an emphasis upon the nature of the
evidence adduced at trial. The courts developed what has been
termed a "gloss," 29 and in effect established a separate standard,"
holding that where the evidence was documentary, the appeals
court was as competent as the trial court to interpret the facts and
judge trustworthiness for itself. In support of this conclusion, the
courts pointed to the admonition to give "due regard . . . to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses, '"32 which was read as a limitation on the application of the
clearly erroneous standard. This reading of the rule was contrary to
its drafters' apparent intent to deemphasize evidentiary distinc-
tions,3 3 although it was consistent with a strict interpretation of the
Although the original language regarding the clearly erroneous standard has remained
unchanged, the rule has been amended twice, in 1946 and again in 1963. The first amendment
placed trials held before an advisory jury in the same status as non-jury trials, permitted
findings of fact and conclusions of law to be incorporated in a memorandum or opinion, and
explicitly stated that findings and conclusions were unnecessary on decisions of motions
except in limited instances. In 1963, the rule was amended to conform with concurrent
amendment to Rule 58. For the text of these amendments and accompanying committee
notes, see MOORE, supra note 9, 52.01[2], [5], [9], [10].
29 The term "gloss" was coined by Judge Clark in an article criticizing the trend toward
modification of the clearly erroneous rule. See note 35 infra.
- See, e.g., Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 169 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 911 (1949); Panama Transp. Co. v. The Maravi, 165 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1948);
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Irelan, 123 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1941); Carter Oil Co. v. McQuigg,
112 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1940); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Bonacci, 111 F.2d 412 (8th
Cir. 1940). The trend was not universally followed, however, and conflicts developed within
and among the circuits, with some courts retaining strict adherence to the rule, applying it
without regard to the nature of the evidence below. See, e.g., Collins v. Commissioner, 216
F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1954); Holt v. Werbe, 198 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1952); Central Ry. Signal Co.
v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952); Quon v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 190 F.2d 257 (9th
Cir. 1951).
' The gloss is traceable to ancient equity practice, where the customary mode of taking
evidence was by deposition and appellate courts were able to exercise broad factual review.
See notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra. With such a background, "it has at least the
merit of being a sound gloss." Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41
MINN. L. Rv. 751, 764 (1957).
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
The Original Committee Note stated: "[The rule] is applicable to all classes of
findings in cases tried without a jury whether the finding is of a fact concerning which there
was a conflict of testimony, or of a fact deduced or inferred from uncontradicted testimony."
ORIGINAL COMMIrEE NOTE, supra note 22, at 7815. In an attempt to reemphasize its intent
1977]
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equity practice that rule 52(a) purportedly adopted.34 Commenting
upon the emerging construction of the rule, Judge Clark observed:
[T]here have appeared judicial statements which suggested a
greater power of review where the evidence below was by deposi-
tion. This was perhaps not harmful, though to add an additional
measure of discretion to a rule calling for the exercise of discretion
was, if not confusing, at least gilding the lily. But by a process
almost inveterate in legal thinking, a negative was soon deduced
as the opposite of the affirmations; and now the definitely erro-
neous gloss is being stated in place of the rule itself to the effect
that the stated rule does not apply at all unless the trial judge saw
the witnesses in person. Hence we have the rule now so overturned
that when the appellate court wishes to apply the policy of non-
reviewability of the original rule, it finds it necessary to utter an
apology for seeming to violate the rule of the case law.3 1
The early judicial gloss placed upon rule 52(a) was carried to
its ultimate refinement by the Second Circuit. In Orvis v. Higgins,
a decision which provoked sharp criticism, 7 the pertinent findings
that the rule be applied in all cases, the Advisory Committee in 1955 proposed an amendment
to rule 52(a), stating:
The amendment is designed to end the confusion and show definitely that the
"clearly erroneous" test is not modified by the language which formerly followed
it, but is applicable in all cases. The separate provision that regard must be given
the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses who appeared
personally emphasizes only the special reluctance which must be felt in holding
clearly erroneous a finding based on oral testimony.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE OF 1955 TO PROPOSED (BUT UNADOPTED) AMENDMENTS TO THE FED-
ERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, quoted in MOORE, supra note 9, 52.01[7], at 2609-10
[hereinafter cited as 1955 COMMITTEE NOTE]. Although the attempted amendment failed, see
notes 52-55 infra, the Committee had made its position clear, prompting the suggestion that
it intended that findings based upon oral evidence be more than clearly erroneous before they
may be set aside. Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documen-
tary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. Rav. 506, 535 (1963).
Judge Clark, one of the drafters of the rule and a vigorous opponent of equity review,
offered the following version of the Committee's intent: "In this rule the design was to develop
a formula which would suggest to the trial court the appropriate value to be placed upon the
direct observations of a witness, but would not make that the controlling criterion of the rule
itself." Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3
VAND. L. REV. 493, 505 (1950).
31 See note 31 supra.
Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3
VAND. L. REv. 493, 505-06 (1950) (footnotes omitted).
36 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
31 See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2587, at 742-49
(1971); Wright, Amendments to the Federal Rules: The Function of a Continuing Rules
Committee, 7 VAND. L. REV. 521, 534 (1954); Note, Scope of Appellate Fact Review Widened,
2 STAN. L. REV. 784, 787-88 (1950); Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact
Based on Documentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. Rav. 506, 520-24 (1963). But see
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of fact made by the lower court were based on both undisputed facts
and oral testimony. 8 In reversing the lower court's decision, Judge
Frank, writing for the Second Circuit, recognized discrete grada-
tions of appellate review.39 In the Judge's view, general or special
jury verdicts must stand when supported by a "reasonable infer-
ence" drawn from the evidence, regardless of whether the evidence
is testimonial or documentary. Where there is no jury, however,
the rule varies with the character of the evidence: (a) If [the
judge] decides a fact issue on written evidence alone, [the appel-
late court is] as able as he to determine credibility, and so we may
disregard his finding. (b) Where the evidence is partly oral and the
balance is written or deals with undisputed facts, then we may
ignore the trial judge's finding and substitute our own, (1) if the
written evidence on some undisputed fact renders the credibility
of the oral testimony extremely doubtful, or (2) if the trial judge's
finding must rest exclusively on the written evidence or the undis-
puted facts, so that his evaluation of credibility has no signifi-
cance. (c) But where the evidence supporting his finding as to any
fact issue is entirely oral testimony, we may disturb that finding
only in the most unusual circumstances."
Thus, under the Second Circuit approach, inferences drawn by the
trial judge from undisputed facts were subjected to the same broad
review as that afforded documentary evidence.
In arriving at this result, Judge Frank relied on United States
v. United States Gypsum Co.," a Supreme Court antitrust case
which established the definitive formulation of the "clearly erro-
MOORE, supra note 9, 52.04.
38 In Orvis, an estate tax case, the decedents, husband and wife, each established a trust
naming the other as beneficiary. The wife died a year before the husband and the value of
the corpus of her trust was included by the Commissioner in the taxable value of his estate
upon a determination that the trusts were intended to be reciprocal. The executors of the
husband's estate paid the tax assessed, and then sued to recover that payment. Although the
executors prevailed in the district court, the defendant appealed, claiming the trusts were
reciprocal and made in contemplation of death. The Second Circuit reversed the factual
conclusion of the district judge, and found the trusts to be reciprocal. 180 F.2d at 541.
31 Id. at 539.
10 Id. at 539-40 (footnotes omitted). Judge Frank noted the ironic consequences of ex-
panded fact review:
A wag might say that a verdict is entitled to high respect because the jurors are
inexperienced in finding facts, an administrative finding is given high respect be-
cause the administrative officers are specialists (guided by experts) in finding a
particular class of facts, but, paradoxically, a trial judge's finding has far less
respect because he is blessed neither with jurors' inexperience nor administrative
officers' expertness.
Id. at 540 n.7.
1 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
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neous" test. In Gypsum, the Court reversed a decision on the ground
that the lower court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous.4" In so
doing, the Gypsum Court articulated a definition of clearly erro-
neous which has enjoyed continued vitality:43 "A finding is 'clearly
erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the review-
ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed."44 Judge Frank re-
lied heavily upon a passage in the Gypsum opinion which states:
"Where such [oral] testimony is in conflict with contemporaneous
documents we can give it little weight, particularly when the crucial
issues involve mixed questions of law and fact. 45 Judge Frank also
found support in the Gypsum Court's statement that the federal
equity practice prior to the adoption of the Rules accorded the trial
court's findings of fact great weight when dependent upon oral testi-
mony.46 The judge, however, apparently discounted or overlooked
other language in Gypsum: "In so far as this finding and others...
are inferences drawn from documents or undisputed facts,. . . Rule
52(a) . . .is applicable."4 More importantly, the oral testimony of
most of the witnesses in Gypsum directly contradicted contempora-
neous documents which tended to show that the witnesses had acted
in concert,48 whereas in Orvis, the oral testimony was never directly
, The Supreme Court reversed a district court judgment for the defendant, a manufac-
turer of gypsum products. The Court held that the lower court findings of fact, i.e., that there
was no conspiracy to eliminate production of a certain type of board, obtain patent licenses,
eliminate the sale of products to jobbers, or fix the price of unpatented gypsum products, were
clearly erroneous. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395-99 (1948).
" 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2585, at 731-32 & n.99
(1971). See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969);
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960); McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S.
19, 20 (1954), all quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948). Although a discussion of what courts consider to be clearly erroneous is beyond the
scope of this Note, it is interesting to note the comment of Judge Hand in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945):
It is idle to try to define the meaning of the phrase, "clearly erroneous"; all that
can be profitably said is that an appellate court, though it will hesitate less to
reverse the finding of a judge than that of an administrative tribunal or of a jury,
will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly and only when well persuaded. This is
true to a considerable degree even when the judge has not seen the witnesses. His
duty is to sift the evidence, to put it into logical sequence and to make the proper
inferences from it; . . . it is physically impossible for an appellate court to function
at all without ascribing some prima facie validity to his conclusions.
Id. at 433 (citation omitted).
" 333 U.S. at 395.
Id. at 396.
" Id. at 395. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra.
" 333 U.S. at 394.
Id. at 395-96.
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contradicted. 9 Irrespective of whether Judge Frank's elaborate clas-
sification of review is desirable, most commentators agreed with the
position of Judge Chase, who dissented in Orvis:
The trial judge saw and heard witnesses who testified concerning
matters which had a direct tendency to explain plausibly how
these two trusts might have been created .
This is a typical instance for the application of Civil Rule
52(a). Though trial judges may at times be mistaken as to facts,
appellate judges are not always omniscient.5'
In 1955, the Advisory Committee proposed an amendment to
rule 52 apparently designed to halt the expansion of factual review
of non-jury cases.52 According to the Committee Note, the proposal
would have established "definitely that the 'clearly erroneous' test
is. . . applicable in all cases. 5 3 The recommendation provided that
"[flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
In the application of this principle regard shall be given to the
special opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of
those witnesses who appeared personally before it. " The amend-
ment was not adopted by the Supreme Court, leading one commen-
tator to conclude that the Court was implicitly supporting a broader
exercise of appellate discretion."
RECENT APPLICATION OF RULE 52(a)
Presently, a majority of the circuits, as well as the Supreme
Court, approves of application of the clearly erroneous rule without
11 The Oruis testimony consisted of statements made by a lawyer concerning the intent
of the decedents in creating their respective trusts. See note 38 supra. These statements were
credited by the trial court, but were discounted by Judge Frank in favor of his own inferences
drawn from undisputed events leading to the creation of the trusts. In the process, the Second
Circuit assumed that the witness spoke the truth, 180 F.2d at 541, but held that "the trial
judge relied on no positive testimony that Mr. and Mrs. Orvis acted independently but relied
merely on negative testimony as to the absence of an expressed intention to act reciprocally
." Id. at 540.
See authorities cited in note 37 supra.
51180 F.2d at 541-42 (Chase, J., dissenting).
5' See PROPOSED (BuT UNADoP'aD) AMENDMENT TO RuLE 52, quoted in MOORE, supra note
9, 52.01[61, at 2607-08.
53 1955 COMMITTEE NoTE, supra note 22, at 2609-10. The amendment was "designed to
correct a judicial gloss upon the rule which had tended to distort it." Id. at 2608.
" PROPOSED (BUT UNADOPTED) AMENDMENT TO RULE 52, quoted in MOORE, supra note 8,
T 52.01[6], at 2607-08 (new matter in italics).
5 Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or
Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REv. 506, 536 (1963).
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regard to the character of the evidence received by the trial court.
There exist subtle intimations of evasion and modification of the
rule, however, which call into question the uniformity of its applica-
tion.57 In light of the Supreme Court's refusal to adopt the 1955
amendment to rule 52(a),58 two of that Court's more recent decisions
merit close examination.
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,5" the Court
unqualifiedly applied the clearly erroneous standard. 0 It should be
noted, however, that the testimony in question in that case was oral,
and the Court affirmed the findings of the lower court." Interest-
ingly, one of the cases cited by the Zenith Court was Orvis v.
Higgins.62 Although the Court referred to that part of the Orvis
opinion which noted the trial court's advantage where oral testi-
mony is involved,63 its citation of Orvis, a decision strongly identi-
fied with broad review, seems to indicate at least tacit approval of
the differing levels of review discussed in that case.
There is more concrete evidence that the Supreme Court will
not strictly apply the clearly erroneous standard in United States
1s As of 1971, Professors Wright and Miller observed a "marked trend" toward the appli-
cation of the clearly erroneous standard to all findings, regardless of the nature of the evi-
dence. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2587, at 748-49 (1971).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its strict adherence to the rule. See, e.g.,
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); United States v.
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 n.9 (1963); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291
(1960); United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952); United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948). But see notes 59-68 and accompa-
nying text infra. Eight circuit courts have expressed adherence to the rule as well: District of
Columbia, First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth. See, e.g., Quarles v.
Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir. 1974); Indiana State Employees Ass'n v.
Negley, 501 F.2d 1239, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1974); Case v. Morrisette, 475 F.2d 1300, 1306-08
(D.C. Cir. 1973); H.K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 437 F.2d 244, 246 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 885 (1971); Leach v. Crucible Center Co., 388 F.2d 176, 178-79
(1st Cir. 1968); Cole v. Neaf, 334 F.2d 326, 329-30 (8th Cir. 1964); Prendis v. Central Gulf
Steamship Co., 330 F.2d 893, 895 (4th Cir. 1963); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 113-
15 (7th Cir. 1962).
37 See notes 97-114 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
59 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
:0 Id. at 123-24.
" Id. at 122 n.18. The Zenith Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, holding that the latter gave "insufficient deference to the findings of
the trial judge..." in resolving one of the many issues in the case. Id. at 122.
12 Id. at 122 n.18 (citing Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 810 (1950)). See notes 36-51 and accompanying text supra.
"3 The Orvis court had stated: "[Wihere the evidence supporting [the trial court's]
finding as to any fact issue is entirely oral testimony, we may disturb that finding only in
the most unusual circumstances." 180 F.2d at 539-40.
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v. General Motors Corp.,4 an antitrust case in which the Court
upset a lower court's finding that no conspiracy had been proven.8 5
Although the Court based its reversal upon the trial court's impro-
per application of the controlling legal standard to the undisputed
facts,8 it went on to rote that the rationale underlying rule 52(a) is
of limited applicability in a case such as this where the evidence is
overwhelmingly documentary in nature." This passage of the opin-
ion appears to suggest that the Supreme Court may not yet have
opted for unqualified application of rule 52(a) .1s
In the decisions of the circuits which mandate strict application
of the clearly erroneous standard, 9 the predominant language indi-
cates that an unequivocal standard of review is being utilized:
[W]e are not to weigh the evidence de novo, or disturb the find-
ings simply because we might have reached a contrary result on
the same evidence. And not only must we give "due regard...
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of
the witnesses," but we must also measure the findings by the
a' 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
Id. at 141-42. Although the district court had found that there existed no conspiracy
which violated the antitrust laws, id. at 140, its express findings of fact included what the
Supreme Court considered to be the essentials of a conspiracy within the meaning of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 140-42. General Motors had acted in concert with certain of its dealers
to stop other dealers from selling cars at lower prices through referral services and discount
houses. The lower court made, inter alia, the following findings of fact: the nonparticipating
dealers had complained to General Motors personnel about the discount sales; General Mo-
tors personnel discussed the matter with every Chevrolet dealer in the area and obtained
promises from these dealers that they would not do business with the discount houses; these
agreements were policed jointly by three dealers' associations at General Motors' request,
which associations supplied information to General Motors and thereby enabled it to bring
"wayward dealers into line;" and a number of reneging dealers were forced to repurchase cars
which they had sold through the discount houses. Id. at 140-41.
11 Id. at 141-42. The court stated:
[T]he question here is not one of 'fact,' but consists rather of the legal standard
required to be applied to the undisputed facts of the case.
S. . We resort to the record not to contradict the trial court's findings of
fact, as distinguished from its conclusory 'findings,' but to supplement the court's
factual findings and to assist us in determining whether they support the court's
ultimate legal conclusion that there was no conspiracy.
Id. at 141 n.16 (emphasis in original).
'? Id.
Although the Court's comments concerning the nature of the evidence adduced at trial
may not have been intended to allow free review of all factual questions, the Court does seem
to have sanctioned a somewhat broader standard of review where the evidence is primarily
documentary. In so doing, the General Motors Court observed that in the case of documentary
evidence, the trial court does not have its "customary opportunity to evaluate the demeanor
and thus the credibility of the witnesses . "Id.
" See cases cited in note 56 supra.
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"clearly erroneous" test even when they are based on inferences
drawn from documents or undisputed facts."0
As previously noted, actual application of the standard had not
always been as clear as the language articulating it,"' and in fact,
the welter of inter-circuit and intra-circuit conflicts7 2 has only re-
7' Case v. Morrisette, 475 F.2d 1300, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Indiana State Employees
Ass'n v. Negley, 501 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1974), wherein it was stated:
"The Court, upon review, will not retry issues of fact or substitute its judgment with
respect to such issues for that of the trial court . . . . The power of a trial court to
decide doubtful issues of fact is not limited to deciding them correctly . . . . In a
non-jury case, this Court may not set aside a finding of fact of a trial court unless
there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, unless it is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or unless it was induced by an erroneous view of the law .... "
Id. at 1241-42 (quoting Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca Cola Co., 139 F.2d 416, 417-18 (8th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 781 (1944)).
" See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
12 Only two of the circuits adhering to the majority position, the Fourth and the Eighth,
have consistently applied the rule strictly. In the Eighth Circuit's leading case, Cole v. Neaf,
334 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1964), the court observed:
We have repeatedly and consistently held, at least subsequent to the Supreme
Court's decision in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein . . . that the
clearly erroneous standard applies to reasonable inferences to be drawn from stipu-
lated or undisputed facts and that it is for the trial court rather than this court to
draw legitimate and permissible inferences.
Id. at 329 (citations omitted). See Salomon v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 38 (1977) in which the court commented that its "duty on appeal
[is] to give great deference to the factual findings of the trial court .... " Id. at 1243. See
also Jarvis v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 525 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1975); United Stores of
America, Inc. v. Insurance Consultants, Inc., 468 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co., 422 F.2d 1272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 855 (1970).
The Fourth Circuit cases, although often containing dictum which tends to cloud their
meaning, express the same commitment to the clearly erroneous standard: "Where much of
the testimony is by deposition, this Court is as able to judge of credibility as the Trial Court;
nevertheless, the findings still must be tested by the 'clearly erroneous' rule .... " Prendis
v. Central Gulf Steamship Co., 330 F.2d 893, 895 (4th Cir. 1963) (citations omitted). See
Wansley v. Slayton, 487 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974), in which
the court treated an issue concerning pretrial publicity as one of mixed law and fact, allowing
the reviewing court to evaluate independently the voir dire testimony of the jurors. Id. at 98.
It was ultimately held that "the District Court was in plain error" in concluding that the jury
was incompetent. Id.
An examination of each of the remaining circuits following the majority view reveals
earlier interpretations of the rule ranging from wholesale adoption of the oral testimony-
documentary evidence dichotomy to complete agreement with the present standard. See, e.g.,
Leach v. Crucible Center Co., 388 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1968); Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d
458 (1st Cir. 1962); Commissioner v. Spermacet Whaling & Shipping Co., S/A, 281 F.2d 646,
651 (6th Cir. 1960); Cherot v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 264 F.2d 767 (10th Cir.
1959); Gudgel v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1959); Commissioner v. Consolidated
Premium Iron Ores, Ltd., 265 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1959); Dixie Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Holland,
255 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1958); Lamb v. ICC, 259 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1958); Yunker v. Commis-
sioner, 256 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1958); Ellison v. Frank, 245 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1957); Randall
Foundation, Inc. v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1957); Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d
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cently resolved itself13 into this "correct" interpretation of rule
52(a) .7
A minority of circuits still appear to afford a trial judge's find-
ings less deference when they are premised upon non-oral testi-
mony.75 There are differences among the circuits, however, with
respect to the standards utilized. The Second Circuit continues to
adhere to the standards articulated in Orvis, applying that deci-
sion's classification in cases where there is no oral testimony. 7
When, however, the district court draws factual inferences from
undisputed basic facts, a line of Second Circuit decisions appears
to depart from the Orvis formulation, and unequivocally applies the
clearly erroneous rule.77 In addition, several recent decisions in that
circuit have employed an enhanced standard of review when prelim-
inary injunctive relief is sought, thereby creating a basis of distinc-
582 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Perry v. Perry, 190 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Dollar v. Land, 184 F.2d
245 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 884 (1950); Blackner v. McDermott, 176 F.2d 498 (10th
Cir. 1944); Bowles v. Beatrice Creamery Co., 146 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1944). The Seventh
Circuit has a long history of employing de novo review where evidence is documentary or
undisputed. See Apolskis v. Concord Life Ins. Co., 445 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1971), in which the
court held that where the underlying facts are unchallenged and undisputed, "the case is in
the same posture as if it had been submitted on stipulated facts and the scope of our review
is broader than it would be if the trial court's findings were based on credibility resolutions
and inferences drawn from conflicting testimony." Id. at 34. Accord, Nasco, Inc. v. Vision-
Wrap, Inc., 352 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1965); Kiwi Coders Corp. v. Arco Tool & Die Works, 250
F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1957). That tradition was ended, however, in Indiana State Employees
Ass'n v. Negley, 501 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1974), quoted in note 70 supra.
7 See notes 56 & 72 and accompanying text supra.
7 See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 76-84 and accompanying text infra.
7' In Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 492 (1977), a copyright infringement case, the court of appeals made its own
determination of similarity, resting its decision solely upon "a comparison of the works in
issue rather than on credibility of witnesses or other evidence only for the factfinder .... "
533 F.2d at 90. Orvis has been perceived as "[standing] for the proposition that a record
consisting only of pleadings, depositions, and affidavits may, at the reviewing court's discre-
tion, be reviewed de novo." Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505
F.2d 989, 1004 (2d Cir. 1974). See Citizens Committee for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d
1065, 1066 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Soptra Fabrics Corp. v.
Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092, 1093 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States
ex rel. Lasky v. LaVallee, 472 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1973); Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus
Brothers Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315, 1317 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
" See Porter v. Commissioner, 437 F.2d 39, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Austin v.
Commissioner, 298 F.2d 583, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1962). In Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377
(2d Cir. 1964), the Second Circuit affirmed a tax court finding that expenses incurred by the
taxpayer were not deductible, in that the taxpayer lacked the requisite genuine profit motive
which would have rendered them business expenses. The court applied the clearly erroneous
test to factual inferences drawn from undisputed basic facts. Id. at 381 (citing Commissioner
v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960)).
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tion which is apparently unique to the Second Circuit.78
Early conflict in the Fifth Circuit has resolved itself into the
adoption of a near-uniform standard of review.79 The Fifth Circuit
seems to have settled on a comfortable medium, i.e., the clearly
erroneous standard is always applied, but the rule is "somewhat
modified" when some or all of the evidence upon which the findings
were based is not "live" testimony." In Sicula Oceanica, S.A. v.
Wilmar Marine Engineering & Sales Corp.,'" the circuit's position
was stated as follows:
The appellant's burden, under . . .[Rule 52(a)], of showing that
the trial judge's findings of fact are "clearly erroneous" is not as
heavy. . . as it would be if the case had turned on the credibility
of witnesses appearing before the trial judge . . . . However, re-
gardless of the documentary nature of the evidence and the process
of drawing inferences from undisputed facts, the reviewing court
must apply the "clearly erroneous" test.82
7' See, e.g., San Filippo v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 525 F.2d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 1975);
Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1972).
" Early Fifth Circuit cases ranged from complete disregard of the clearly erroneous
standard when undisputed testimony was involved, to strict application of the standard
under all circumstances. Compare Frazier v. Alabama Motor Club, Inc., 349 F.2d 456, 458
(5th Cir. 1965), with Chared Corp. v. United States, 446 F.2d 745, 746 (5th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) and Commissioner v. Welch, 345 F.2d 939, 943-44 (5th Cir. 1965). Some of these
earlier decisions seemed to evade the clearly erroneous rule, not by refusing to apply it, but
by excepting from it questions of "ultimate fact," i.e., questions involving "the result reached
by processes of legal reasoning from, or the interpretation of the legal significance of, the
evidentiary facts .... " Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954).
See notes 112-114 and accompanying text infra. However, United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d
899 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1707 (1977), struck a cautionary note:
[The] process of subjecting inferences or ultimate facts to a broader review is not
novel . . . . We stress, however, that we by no means adopt the requirement of a
de novo review. We say no more than that the clearly erroneous rule is to be limited
to its proper sphere. It is not to be discarded.
535 F.2d at 907 (citations omitted). More recent cases, however, apply only one standard;
the clearly erroneous rule is followed, but the burden of showing a lower court's findings to
be clearly erroneous is reduced when the evidence is documentary or undisputed. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1975); Burston v. Caldwell,
506 F.2d 24 (5th Cir. 1975); Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Stringfellow, 414 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1969).
" See Caradelis v. Refineria Panama, S.A., 384 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1967). See also
Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1954), in which the court stated:
"[Tihe burden of showing a finding of fact 'clearly erroneous' . . . is lighter, much lighter,
when we consider logical inferences drawn from undisputed facts or from documents, though
the 'clearly erroneous' rule is still applicable." Id. at 219 (citations omitted).
" 413 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1969).
"z Id. at 1333-34 (citations and footnote omitted), quoted in Volkswagen of America, Inc.
v. Jahre, 472 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
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This formulation would seem to fulfill the desired goal of definite
and uniform application of rule 52(a)83 as well as lend flexibility to
the exercise of judicial discretion."
ADDITIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING APPLICATION OF RULE 52(a)
In recent years, the uniform application of the rule intended by
the drafters has been influenced by two major factors: a review
court's initial conclusion as to whether a determination is one of fact
or law, and, at least in the Second Circuit, whether the factfinding
relates to an application for preliminary injunctive relief. Of late,
these factors often appear determinative of the scope of review un-
dertaken by a court.
Preliminary Injunction
There are two alternative bases for the granting of a prelimi-
nary injunction: there must be a" 'clear showing of either (1) proba-
ble success on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2)
sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair
ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly
toward the party requesting the preliminary relief,' "85 in addition
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
"It is interesting to note that the Third Circuit is still struggling to develop a consistent
formulation of rule 52(a). The early decisions of that circuit are typified by In re Kellett
Aircraft Corp., 186 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1950), in which the court stated: "This court has squarely
held that Rule 52(a) does not impose the clearly erroneous standard of finality on 'the infer-
ences or conclusions drawn by the trial court from its fact findings.'" Id. at 200 (quoting
Kuhn v. Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis, 119 F.2d 704, 705 (3d Cir. 1941)). In a later case
involving a patent infringement, the court applied the same reasoning; since all of the evi-
dence was documentary, the court felt free to make its own findings based on the evidence.
Borden Co. v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 369 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1966). In 1968, however, rule
52(a) was applied literally to the findings of a district court which were premised upon certain
expert testimony. Sperti Prods., Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., 399 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1968) (per
curiam). A dissenting judge criticized the majority's application of the clearly erroneous
standard on the ground that "[tihe District Court's opinion clearly indicates that its finding
• . .is premised on several patents and publications and not on oral testimony." Id. at 610
(Kalodner, J., dissenting). Two 1971 decisions of the Third Circuit, however, seem to point
in opposite directions. In Butler v. Colfelt, 439 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), the court
affirmed a district court's finding of manufactured diversity jurisdiction and refused to pur-
sue the question of the applicability of rule 52(a), since "on an independent review of the
dispositions . . .[the court arrived] at the same conclusion as the district court." Id. at 884.
Shortly after Butler, in Baker v. United Transp. Union, 455 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1971), a panel
of the Third Circuit stated: "The record in this case is replete with undisputed documentary
evidence that permits us to ascertain the existence or non-existence of the past practice
without remanding the case to the district court." Id. at 155. Since the court never mentioned
rule 52(a) expressly, however, the decision would seem not to be an affirmation of de novo
review.
11 Triebwasser & Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1358 (2d Cir. 1976)
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to a "clear showing of the threat of irreparable harm.""6 The scope
of appellate review of the grant or denial of preliminary relief is
generally limited to a determination of "whether the court abused
its discretion."87 A line of recent Second Circuit decisions has de-
parted from this standard, however, allowing de novo review of the
lower court's decision to grant or deny an injunction when that
decision rests solely on documentary evidence. 8
This trend has been examined by the Second Circuit in State
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,9 wherein a district court's
denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed. In the course of its
opinion, the court of appeals discussed two of its previous cases ° in
which de novo review of the district courts' decisions had been justi-
fied on the ground that the lack of an evidentiary hearing permitted
the appellate court to make its own findings based on purely docu-
mentary evidence." The Nuclear Regulatory Commission court
emphasized that the expanded factual review authorized by its
earlier decision in Orvis v. Higgins" will be utilized only in the
discretion of the reviewing court.13 The Second Circuit went on to
set forth the following guidelines for the exercise of that discretion:
review may be more readily expanded when a preliminary injunc-
tion, a "drastic remedy," has been granted rather than denied on
documentary evidence; as the findings become more detailed and
specific, the scope of appellate review should proportionally de-
crease; and review may be expanded where there are defects in
the proceedings of the lower court not related to any of its findings. 4
(quoting Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973)
(emphasis in original)); accord, Clairol, Inc. v. Gillette Co., 389 F.2d 264, 265 (2d Cir. 1968);
Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 366 F.2d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 1966).
,' Triebwasser & Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1359 (2d Cir. 1976).
See Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973); Pride
v. Community School Bd., 482 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1973).
' United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1936); see, e.g., Triebwasser & Katz v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535, F.2d 1356, 1358 (2d Cir. 1976).
" See Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 210, 211 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); San Filippo v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 525 F.2d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 1975); Fur
Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 501 F.2d 1048, 1050-51 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873, 878-79
(2d Cir. 1972).
, 550 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1977).
0 San Filippo v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 525 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1975); Dopp v. Frank-
lin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1972).
,1 550 F.2d at 751 (citing San Filippo v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 525 F.2d 508, 511
(2d Cir. 1975); Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1972)).
12 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
g3 550 F.2d at 752.
" Id. at 752-51.
[Vol. 52:68
APPELLATE FACT REVIEW
On the basis of these criteria, the court in this instance decided not
to expand its review of the lower court's denial of a preliminary
injunction.15 This approach appears to establish a reasonable stan-
dard for appellate review, one which neither ignores the role of the
trial court nor is overly deferential to that court's determinations.
It is submitted that the Second Circuit view, like the "somewhat
modified" approach generally employed by the Fifth Circuit,96
maintains the spirit of the clearly erroneous standard while lending
to it a measure of discretion and flexibility.
Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law?
Commentators have lamented the fact that there is "no litmus
test for determining whether a given proposition is properly a find-
ing of fact or a conclusion of law."" Questions of fact are those whose
resolution is "based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding
tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct." 9
Legal conclusions are those which are "based on application of a
legal standard."99 These definitions offer sufficient guidance for
cases at either end of the spectrum, but are of little assistance in
less extreme situations. The determination whether a question is
one of fact or law is vital to the applicability of rule 52(a), since the
clearly erroneous standard is expressly applied only to "findings of
fact."'9 0 As a result, various courts have avoided the application of
the rule by finding the question under consideration to be something
other than one of pure fact.'"' An examination of several cases serves
11 Id. at 753. The court distinguished the factual situation before it from that presented
in Dopp and San Filippo. In Dopp, the trial judge granted relief solely on the basis of
documents which were in direct conflict, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, and
without giving any reason for his decision. Id. at 752. In San Filippo, although the court
refused to grant the injunctive relief sought, it did not set forth specific findings of fact as
required by rule 52(a). Thus, the appellate court was compelled to make its own findings as
an alternative to reversing the entire case. Id. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission court
found the district judge's decision to be free from "glaring infirmities" which might prompt
expanded review. The court also considered the fact that the district judge had refused to
grant the injunctive relief sought. Id. at 753.
" See notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra.
" CALIFORNIA COMM. ON CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE § 839
(1961).
" Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 115 (9th Cir. 1962).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
,02 See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co., 540 F.2d 927, 930 n.4 (8th Cir. 1976);
J. B. Williams Co. v. Le Cont6 Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954);
Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or Undisputed
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to illustrate the diverse conclusions reached in similar factual set-
tings.
In a very recent case, Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip
Co., 10 a determination that the question presented was one of mixed
law and fact provided the justification for de novo review." 3 Of
interest is the fact that the evidence evaluated was documentary
and undisputed. 4 The extent of the similarity in appearance be-
tween two packages of corn chips was the precise question before the
court,' ' a question, it is submitted, which many would consider to
be of fact.
Similarly, the likelihood of confusion of two trademarks has
been found by one court to be a factual conclusion subject to the
clearly erroneous standard,' 6 while another court has held the same
question to be one of law, fully reviewable on appeal.0 7 In the first
case, the likelihood of confusion between "SARDE" and "SARAH"
was held to'be a question of fact; the possibility of confusion be-
tween "Conti" and "Le Cont6" in the second case was denominated
a determination of law. Significantly, in both cases the evidence
submitted at trial was entirely documentary,"8 and both decisions
were rendered by circuits which profess to apply the clearly erro-
neous standard without regard to the nature of the underlying evi-
dence."H9 Moreover, the court which found the determination to be
Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506, 527-30 (1963) (discussing Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218
F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1954)).
102 540 F.2d 927 (8th Cir. 1976).
"0 Id. at 930 n.4.
101 Id. at 929.
,o The court found the district judge incorrect in holding that the packages were not
confusingly similar:
We reach this conclusion by applying the same "eyeball" test as that applied
by the District Court. We do not say that six eyes are necessarily apt to reach a
more accurate assessment than are two, but, under the standard of review applica-
ble in this case, our six eyes tell us that the color of the packages is similar.
Id. at 931.
101 Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 920 (1976). The court of appeals affirmed a trial court decision upholding a
finding by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that the two trademarks, "SARAH" and
"SARDE," presented no likelihood of confusion.
107 J. B. Williams Co. v. Le Cont6 Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). The appellate court reversed the trial court's finding of no
reasonable likelihood of confusion between trademarks "Conti" and "Le Cont6" in an action
to recover for trademark infringement and unfair competition. 523 F.2d at 193.
'"I Sarah Coventry, Inc. v. T. Sardelli & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d at 22; J. B. Williams v. Le
Cont6 Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d at 190-91.
I"0 See notes 56 & 69 and accompanying text supra. Sarah Coventry was a case in the
First Circuit; J. B. Williams was decided by the Ninth Circuit.
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one of law indicated that where the trial court's conclusion is de-
rived from disputed facts, the clearly erroneous rule would apply."'
The court went on to note:
However, if the facts are not in dispute, the appellate court is "in
as good a. position as the trial judge to determine the probability
of confusion" ....
• ..Since no issue of material fact arises from the affidavits,
exhibits and stipulated facts, the determination by the trial judge,
as to whether in light of those undisputed facts there existed a
"likelihood of confusion" between Conti and Le Conte is a ques-
tion of law, readily reviewable by this Court."'
This language, coupled with the two differing results, gives rise to
an inference that the labels "law" and "fact" have been used, per-
haps inadvertently, to mask whaz is in reality application of rule
52(a) on the traditional basis of the nature of the underlying evi-
dence.
Some courts have exempted findings of "ultimate fact" from
the strict application of rule 52(a). In justification of this position,
the Fifth Circuit has reasoned:
Insofar . . .as the so-called "ultimate fact" is simply the result
reached by processes of legal reasoning from, or the interpretation
of the legal significance of, the evidentiary facts, it is "subject to
review free of the restraining impact of the so-called 'clearly erro-
neous' rule.""1'2
Carried to its logical conclusion, this approach would exempt all but
the most basic factual determinations from review under the clearly
erroneous standard, since almost every question presented in an
action involves some measure of legal reasoning or interpretation.
Nonetheless, this concept of ultimate fact, under which a broad
factual inference may be reviewed as a question of law,"3 is used
J, j. B. Williams Co. v. Le Cont6 Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d at 190.
' Id. at 190-91 (citations and footnotes omitted).
112 Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954) (quoting Lehmann
v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592, 594 (3d Cir. 1953)).
"I See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co., 540 F.2d 927 (8th Cir. 1976), wherein
the court noted:
The factual determinations underlying the issue of "similarity" remain subject
to the clearly erroneous standard of review. The "similarity" determination is itself
more a mixed question of law and fact. The distinction may be elusive in a case
such as this, where, upon the narrow determination of similarity, we are in truth
expressing our definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Id. at 930 n.4 (citation omitted).
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regularly by circuit courts which purport to apply strictly the clearly
erroneous rule.114
CONCLUSION
Although rule 52(a) seems clear on its face and its drafters
intended it to apply in all cases, its application in cases where the
evidence is documentary or undisputed has been anything but uni-
form. The initial evasion of the rule by many circuit courts, charac-
terized as a "misunderstanding" of the rule by one student com-
mentator,"5 may have been in fact attributable to judicial dissatis-
faction with a rule perceived as overly restrictive of the power of the
appellate court to make a necessary and proper review of all the
factors leading to a lower court decision. Most of the excesses of the
past have been rectified, however, and a clear majority of the cir-
cuits now apply the clearly erroneous test in all cases,"' notwith-
standing the character of the evidence. Nonetheless, at least one
subtle method of evading application of the rule has recently
emerged: the courts are beginning to shade fact into law in instances
involving documentary evidence, apparently in an effort to render
findings more freely reviewable at the appellate level.
There is little doubt that from a purely rational standpoint,
there is sound justification for de novo review where the evidence is
wholly documentary or undisputed. The appellate court is in as
favorable a position as the trial court to draw inferences from a
written record and make its own findings."7 In concentrating on the
competence of an appellate court to decide factual issues on the
basis of the record, however, the argument in support of de novo
review neglects the other aspect of appellate review, i.e., the proper
function of an appellate court. The primary function of such a tri-
bunal is not to find facts; rather, it is to interpret the law. The
consequences of appellate courts serving as the "ultimate trier of
fact issues" are said to be disorder in the administration of justice,
diminished public confidence in the decisions of lower courts, and
"' See, e.g., Frito-Lay, Inc. v. So Good Potato Chip Co., 640 F.2d 927 (8th Cir. 1976); J.
B. Williams Co. v. Le Cont6 Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 913 (1976); Yorke v. Thomas Iseri Produce Co., 418 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1969). See also
Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 297 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1961); Mitchell v. Raines, 238 F.2d
186 (5th Cir. 1956).
"I Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or
Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REv. 506, 535 (1963).
"I See notes 56, 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
7 See notes 12-14 and accompanying test supra.
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an increased number of appeals.""
The notion of broadened authority to review factual findings
has been perceived as stemming from a desire to "do justice" in a
particular case, while disregarding the consequences of increased
appellate power."' It is true that an enhanced scope of review can
lead to a multiplicity of appeals and derogation of the function of
the trial court, but the consequences of severely limiting review in
nonjury cases can be equally unsatisfactory. Unfair and unjust
holdings which are impervious to reversal could lead to contempt for
the entire judicial system.12
Rather than devising subtle techniques by which the clearly
erroneous rule may be avoided, would it not be better to simply
admit to the "rational and practical distinction between demeanor
and non-demeanor testimony?' '12' The approach adopted by the
Fifth Circuit seems to recognize this distinction; it applies the rule
in all cases, but lightens the burden of showing a lower court finding
to be clearly erroneous when that finding is based upon documen-
tary or undisputed evidence.1 2 Adoption of such an approach might
eliminate the inclination of some courts to express adherence to rule
52(a) while avoiding its strict application. It is hoped that the courts
of appeals will follow the lead of the Fifth Circuit, and squarely
confront the question of the applicability of rule 52(a).
Susan R. Petito
"' See Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950).
,, See Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751,
779 (1957).
'2 See note 24 supra.
12 MooRE, supra note 9, 52.01[8], at 2610.
' See notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra.
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